N.1/2018 Studi cartesiani tra Europa e Brasile
La concezione cartesiana del soggetto: l’anima e l’animale razionale
Enéias Júnior Forlin
Universidade Estadual de Campinas – UNICAMP
Published in June, 2018
The Cartesian conception of the subject: the soul and the rational animal
The Cartesian conception of subjectivity has often been misinterpreted in the light of four interpretative mistakes. According to the first one, Descartes is the inventor of the real distinction between the nature of the spirit and the matter; secondly, Descartes defended this approach on the basis of a spiritualist and theological intention; thirdly, the free will is the most essential and important faculty of the soul; finally, the Cartesian conception of Soul or Spirit consists of the Cartesian conception of man or rational animal. This article aims to prove that not only are these opinions false, but they are also contrary to Descartes’ intentions.
Soul, Intellect, Will, Matter, Rational Animal, Passions