N.1/2018 Studi cartesiani tra Europa e Brasile

La concezione cartesiana del soggetto: l’anima e l’animale razionale

Enéias Júnior Forlin
Universidade Estadual de Campinas – UNICAMP

Published in June, 2018

The Cartesian conception of the subject: the soul and the rational animal

Abstract

The Cartesian conception of subjectivity has often been misinterpreted in the light of four interpretative mistakes. According to the first one, Descartes is the inventor of the real distinction between the nature of the spirit and the matter; secondly, Descartes defended this approach on the basis of a spiritualist and theological intention; thirdly, the free will is the most essential and important faculty of the soul; finally, the Cartesian conception of Soul or Spirit consists of the Cartesian conception of man or rational animal. This article aims to prove that not only are these opinions false, but they are also contrary to Descartes’ intentions.

Keywords

Soul, Intellect, Will, Matter, Rational Animal, Passions

Critical Journal of History of Ideas
International Philosophy Journal

Editor-in-chief
Andrea Tagliapietra and Sebastiano Ghisu

Editor
Giovanni Campus

Authorized by Tribunale di Sassari n.455 del 14/7/2008 - ISSN 2035-732X - ISSN (Paper edition) 2035-732X

Credits:

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