The aim of the paper is to show the transcendental meaning of some issues raised by the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein. For this purpose, we discuss the concept of form of life, identifying the disruptive element of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the role entrusted to practices, responsible for the constitution and evolution of forms. In this process, practices regulate and generate forms in a movement that, on the side of acting, remains unfounded. The argument is structured as follows: first, we discuss the ambiguities of the concept of “form of life”. In so doing, we analyze the notion of “form” in the Tractatus, of which Lebensform would represent a natural evolution. Starting from these results, we then describe the action of what we call “shaping practices” in relation to the constitution of life-forms. Finally, the solution reached in the first part shows the extent to which Wittgenstein’s reflections on form – and on forms of life – can be defined as essentially transcendental.